

# Follow the Crowds? A Quasi-Experimental Study of “Social Signal” Effects on Online Design Ratings

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## Introduction

How does the availability of social signals change voters' behavior in three voter constituencies?



### 1. The volume of scores:

**H1:** The availability of social signals **increases** the volume of judgments provided by regular voters and non-regular voters.


### 2. The mean of scores:

**H2:** The availability of social signals is more likely to change the mean of judgments among regular voters than non-regular voters.

### 3. The variance of scores:

**H3a:** The availability of social signals **increases** the variance of judgments among regular voters.  
**H3b:** The availability of social signals **decreases** the variance of judgments among non-regular voters.

## Results



H1: Volume of Scores per Day

Voter Type	Regular Voters	One-Day Voters	One-Time Voters
ARIMA(p,d,q)	(1,1,3)	(1,1,3)	(1,1,1)
AR1	0.41***	0.42***	0.28***
AR2			-0.34
MA1	-0.80***	-0.80***	-0.94***
MA2	0.08	0.08	-0.36
MA3	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.94***
<b>Intervention</b>	<b>5,687.01</b>	<b>2,717.85</b>	<b>82.75</b>
<b>Delay(Inter)</b>	<b>-0.31</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>-0.03</b>
# Design	94.15***	92.34***	4.42***
R-squared	0.70	0.70	0.28
Ljung-Box	0.00	0.24	0.01

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. N = 792 days.

H2: Mean of Scores per Day

Voter Type	Regular Voters	One-Day Voters	One-Time Voters
ARIMA(p,d,q)	(4,1,4)	(4,1,4)	(1,1,1)
AR1	0.29	0.26	0.06*
AR2	-0.66***	-0.67***	
AR3	0.69***	0.66***	
AR4	0.00	0.00	
MA1	-1.05***	-1.03***	-0.96***
MA2	0.81***	0.81***	-0.96***
MA3	-1.14***	-1.13***	-0.82***
MA4	0.44**	0.42*	-0.14***
<b>Intervention</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	<b>-0.16***</b>	<b>0.19</b>
<b>Delay(Inter)</b>	<b>0.85***</b>	<b>-0.35</b>	<b>0.00</b>
# Designs	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
R-squared	0.72	0.72	0.13
Ljung-Box	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. N = 792 days.

H3a & 3b: Variance of Scores per Day

Voter Type	Regular Voters	One-Day Voters	One-Time Voters
ARIMA(p,d,q)	(1,1,1)	(1,1,1)	(2,0,0)
AR1	0.11***	0.11***	0.06*
AR2			0.05
MA1	-0.93***	-0.93***	-0.97***
<b>Intervention</b>	<b>-0.03**</b>	<b>-0.03</b>	<b>0.04**</b>
<b>Delay(Inter)</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>-0.00</b>
# Designs	-0.00	-0.00	0.00*
Intercept		1.57***	1.57***
R-squared	0.29	0.29	0.04
Ljung-Box	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. N = 792 days.


## Method

Sample from Threadless:

- Over 35 million votes cast between January 1, 2009 and March 3, 2011
- A total of 792 observational days
- Around 286,000 unique voters, and 68,000 design graphics

**Intervention:**

- **Threadless** made the current average score of t-shirt designs available to voters immediately after their votes for designs on January 20, 2011
- Its intent was to increase the volume of scores on designs



Voter constituencies:

- One-time voters: those who only voted once
- One-time voters: those who voted multiple times over the course of one day
- Regular voters: other voters who voted on multiple days

Outcome Measures:

- The volume of scores per day: an aggregate number of votes for designs per day among each voter constituency
- The mean of scores per day: the mean of all scores cast by each voter constituency per day
- The variance of scores per day: standard deviation of scores per day among each voter constituency

## Acknowledgements

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## Discussion

### 1. The volume of scores:

- Our results do not support for the effect of the intervention on the volume of scores (**H1 → X**)
- **The intent of the intervention was not fulfilled**

### 2. The mean of scores:

- The intervention decreases the average score per day by regular voters (**H2 → O**)
- **the observational learning among regular voters occurred**

### 3. The variance of scores:

- The intervention increases the variance of scores per day among regular voters (**H3a → X**)
- The intervention decreases the variance of scores among one-day voters (**H3b → X**)
- **The intervention has conditional effects on the variance of scores among voter constituencies**